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The Supreme Court as a Tool of Foreign Policy?: 
Why a Proposed Flexible Framework of 
Established Judicial Doctrine Better Satisfies 
Foreign Policy Concerns in Alien Tort Statute 
Litigation 
Lucas Curtis 
  INTRODUCTION   
Human rights victims and advocates in the United States 
have been dealt a near-fatal blow. Since 1980, human rights ac-
tivists have used the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) to obtain redress 
for victims of human rights violations.1 However, in the recent 
Jesner v. Arab Bank decision, the United States Supreme Court 
held that human rights victims can no longer sue foreign corpo-
rations in American courts under the ATS.2 The result has been 
devastating to human rights litigators and plaintiffs alike.  
In Cote d’Ivoire, child slaves were allegedly forced to harvest 
cocoa for the benefit of numerous multinational corporations, in-
cluding Nestle and Cargill.3 Children were kidnapped, forced to 
work fourteen-hour days without pay, and were subjected to tor-
ture and beatings.4 The former child laborers filed a class action 
lawsuit against multiple international corporations in the Cen-
tral District of California.5 Following Jesner, the Ninth Circuit 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. in Po-
litical Science/International Relations, 2017 Carleton College. I would like to 
thank Dean Garry W. Jenkins, Professor Jon J. Lee, and Professor Jennifer M. 
Green for their valuable guidance and input during the Note-writing process. 
Copyright © 2020 by Lucas Curtis. 
 1. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1397–98 (2018) (discussing 
the history of ATS litigation beginning with Filartiga (citing Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980))). 
 2. Id. at 1403. 
 3. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 4. Id. at 1122. 
 5. Id. 
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promptly dismissed all foreign corporations from the suit, many 
of whom operated within Cote d’Ivoire.6  
In Israel, civilians fell victim to thousands of unguided mis-
sile attacks from Hezbollah, which resulted in the death of forty-
three Israeli civilians.7 Bank Saderat Iran and Bank Saderat 
PLC, both foreign banks, allegedly aided the transfer of funds 
used for the attacks perpetrated by Hezbollah.8 The Israeli civil-
ians affected by the horrendous attacks brought an action under 
the ATS in the District Court for the District of Columbia,9 but 
the D.C. Circuit, relying on Jesner, upheld the bar on foreign cor-
porate liability and affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss 
the plaintiffs’ case against the banks.10 In a similar case, families 
throughout the Middle East banded together to make a legal 
stand against Hamas and their alleged coconspirators.11 Plain-
tiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of New York against Arab 
Bank, a Jordanian corporation that allegedly funded attacks 
completed by Hamas that killed members of the plaintiffs’ fami-
lies.12 Again, the court used Jesner and would not allow a suit 
against a foreign corporation under the ATS to move forward.13  
As shown above, Jesner ’s bar on foreign corporate liability 
under the ATS has severely limited redress for victims of human 
rights abuses. However, the Jesner decision is emblematic of a 
series of restrictive rules and cases that have narrowed the scope 
of the ATS since the turn of the twenty-first century.14 Jesner is 
 
 6. Id. at 1122, 1127 (“Defendants are large manufacturers, purchasers, 
processors, and retail sellers of cocoa beans. Several of them are foreign corpo-
rations that are not subject to suit under the ATS.”). 
 7. Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 
504–05 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 8. Id. at 505.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 516 (“We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of the ATS 
claims against the Banks based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jesner.”). 
 11. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1393–94 (2018). 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 1403 (“[I]t would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liabil-
ity to foreign corporations.”). 
 14. See, e.g., id. (eliminating all foreign corporate liability under the ATS); 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013) (barring all 
claims under the ATS where the relevant conduct took place in foreign jurisdic-
tions); see also Rich Samp, U.S. Supreme Court Continues To Nibble Away at 
Alien Tort Statute’s Sweep, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/wlf/2018/04/25/u-s-supreme-court-continues-to-nibble-away-at-alien-tort 
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not only symptomatic of the Supreme Court’s concern for sweep-
ing ATS litigation;15 it is largely symptomatic of the Court’s fear 
of foreign policy implications and overstepping its constitutional 
boundaries.16 The Supreme Court believes awarding remedies to 
victims of international laws may hamper the ability of the other 
branches to engage in other foreign policy solutions,17 and thus 
has consistently curtailed the reach of the ATS.18 The Supreme 
Court’s struggle with the scope of the ATS highlights the ques-
tion: what is the best way to balance the need for redress under 
the ATS while honoring legitimate foreign policy concerns with 
judicial intervention?  
This Note proposes a three-step framework that applies tra-
ditional judicial doctrines to ATS claims in order to effectively 
balance the importance of providing remedies for victims of hu-
man rights violations in the interest of foreign policy against le-
gitimate concerns of judicial interference in foreign affairs. 
Drawing on multiple court-fashioned foreign policy doctrines, 
this Note argues that the Court should employ and favor existing 
flexible judicial doctrines in the evaluation of ATS suits because 
it gives the political branches more options to implement foreign 
policy-making and promotes the United States’ interest of being 
a human rights-compliant, global player.  
Part I discusses the constitutional underpinnings of the Ju-
diciary’s wariness of involving itself in foreign affairs, the devel-
 
-statutes-sweep/ [https://perma.cc/2H9F-XNAU] (discussing the timeline of Su-
preme Court decisions that have narrowed the applicability of the ATS); Milena 
Sterio, Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations: The Future of the Alien 
Tort Claims Act, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 127, 130 (2018) (“In light of such 
increasing reliance on the [ATS], since Filartiga, the Supreme Court 
has . . . weighed in to limit the scope and reach of the [ATS].”). 
 15. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398 (“The extent and scope of this litigation in 
United States courts have resulted in criticism here and abroad.”); see also 
Leading Cases—Federal Statutes—Alien Tort Statute—Foreign Corporate Lia-
bility—Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 132 HARV. L. REV. 397, 397 (2018) (noting 
that the Supreme Court has increasingly become concerned with the rise of ATS 
litigation). 
 16. See, e.g., Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1404 (“[S]ignificant foreign-policy impli-
cations require the courts to draw a careful balance in defining the scope of ac-
tions under the ATS.”). 
 17. Id. at 1398 (“The Court was quite explicit, however, in holding that ATS 
litigation implicates serious separation-of-powers and foreign-relations con-
cerns.” (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727‒28 (2004))). 
 18. Samp, supra note 14. 
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opment of judicial doctrine to limit judicial interference in for-
eign affairs, and the history of the ATS. Part II discusses how 
the Supreme Court has overregulated itself in ATS jurispru-
dence for fear of judicial interference in the political branches’ 
foreign affairs powers, leading up to and including the seminal 
Jesner decision. Part II then discusses the need for and ad-
vantages of having a flexible framework as applied to the evalu-
ation of ATS claims. Part III proposes a three-step framework in 
which the Supreme Court applies three distinct judicial doc-
trines which address concerns raised by the Supreme Court. 
Part III then applies this framework to Doe v. Nestle in order to 
illustrate its effectiveness in alleviating the foreign policy con-
cerns raised by the Supreme Court.  
Ultimately, this Note argues that existing foreign policy doc-
trine promoting judicial restraint most effectively satisfies the 
judicial overreach concerns while allowing the political branches 
to effectuate their foreign policy preferences through the Judici-
ary. This Note fulfills a significant role in ATS, international hu-
man rights, and American foreign policy literature by providing 
a novel solution from a foreign policy perspective, incorporating 
and unifying disconnected ATS scholarship, and harmonizing ju-
dicial doctrinal practice in foreign relations law. 
I.  HISTORY OF FOREIGN POLICY RESTRAINT AND THE 
ALIEN TORT STATUTE   
Courts have long been wary of impeding the political 
branches’ ability to govern foreign affairs.19 The Supreme Court 
has enunciated numerous doctrines giving significant deference 
to both the Legislative and Executive Branches in cases impli-
cating foreign relations.20 This Part addresses both the rationale 
of judicial deference in cases implicating foreign policy, as well 
as the origins and history of the ATS. Section I.A explores the 
 
 19. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (“The 
conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Consti-
tution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—Departments of the 
Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this po-
litical power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”). 
 20. See 13C RICHARD D. FREER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 3534.2 (3d ed. Aug. 2019 update); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron 
Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 659 (2000) (“Since early in 
the nation’s history, courts have been reluctant to contradict the [E]xecutive 
[B]ranch in its conduct of foreign relations.”). 
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constitutional underpinnings of judicial deference to the “politi-
cal” branches in the realm of foreign affairs. Section I.B dis-
cusses the difference between judicial doctrines and the Court’s 
evaluation of cases that implicate foreign policy. Section I.C 
traces the history of the ATS and its development as a tool for 
holding international human rights violators accountable in the 
face of foreign resistance. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF FOREIGN POLICY 
DEFERENCE  
Judicial deference to other branches regarding foreign af-
fairs is rooted within the notion of separation of powers.21 To 
avoid tyranny and authoritarianism, the Founding Fathers con-
structed three separate branches of government, each endowed 
with their own responsibilities and abilities to check the power 
of the others.22 John Jay and James Madison both expressed the 
importance of foreign policy-makers remaining independent and 
requiring specialized knowledge in foreign affairs.23  
The Constitution explicitly delegates foreign affairs powers 
to both the Executive and Legislative Branches, but not to the 
Judiciary.24 The President is the Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States,25 has the ability to appoint 
ambassadors,26 and may make treaties.27 Congress has the abil-
ity to declare war,28 maintain the Army and Navy of the United 
 
 21. See Catherine Henson Curlet, Should a Statement of Interest Matter?: 
Judging Executive Branch Foreign Policy Concerns, 44 GA. L. REV. 1063, 1070–
71 (2010) (noting the rationale for judicial deference when dealing with foreign 
affairs). 
 22. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 1 (3d ed. 2006) (emphasizing that the structure of the United States 
government serves to “lessen the possibility of tyrannical rule”). 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (discuss-
ing the importance of shielding foreign policy makers from foreign influence); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (discussing 
the requirement that legislators have knowledge of foreign policy in order to 
ensure a functional government). 
 24. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.  
 25. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 26. Id. cl. 2. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
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States,29 regulate commerce with other countries,30 and to make 
laws for conduct at sea and incorporate and punish under inter-
national law.31 The President must also submit treaties and am-
bassador selections to the Senate for “Advice and Consent.”32 
The Constitution, however, does not wholly allocate the foreign 
affairs power to either the Executive Branch or the Legislative 
Branch, making the boundaries of policy-making responsibilities 
between the two political branches unclear.33 Although the Judi-
ciary is not afforded foreign policy-making powers, the Constitu-
tion does not limit the ability of courts to hear cases that impli-
cate United States foreign relations as long as they satisfy the 
case and controversy requirements of Article III.34  
In the face of numerous explicit grants of power to the Leg-
islative and Executive Branches to govern foreign relations, the 
Judiciary has remained respectful of the foreign policy decisions 
of both branches.35 Even in the foundational case, Marbury v. 
Madison, Chief Justice Marshall and the Supreme Court recog-
nized that foreign policy, especially within the Executive 
Branch, requires judicial deference and limited judicial interfer-
ence.36 As a foreign policy-maker, the Executive Branch required 
 
 29. Id. cl. 12–13.  
 30. Id. cl. 3. 
 31. Id. § 10. 
 32. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 33. See Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 
AM. J. INT’L L. 805, 806 (1989) (explaining that the lack of textual disposition of 
foreign policy powers creates an unresolved process for courts that define the 
roles of the political branches in the foreign policy arena).  
 34. See id. (“[The Constitution] contains no textual basis for excluding, lim-
iting or altering the role of the courts when the cases or controversies they are 
called upon to decide relate to U.S. foreign relations.”).  
 35. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (“The 
conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Consti-
tution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—Departments of the 
Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this po-
litical power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”); see also LOUIS HEN-
KIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 132 (2d ed. 
1996) (putting succinctly that “foreign affairs make a difference”); Bradley, su-
pra note 20, at 663–64 (noting that early jurisprudence has remarked that do-
mestic and foreign affairs are fundamentally different). 
 36. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166, 170 (1803); Jide 
Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 946 (2004) 
(explaining Justice Marshall’s recognition of the inherently executive power of 
governing foreign policy). 
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“a high degree of flexibility,”37 and traditional constitutional ju-
risprudence views the President as “the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations.”38 Despite 
older jurisprudence primarily focusing on the Executive Branch, 
legal scholars have been quick to note that the courts are also 
deferential to the foreign policy decisions of Congress.39 Con-
gress has been allocated substantial foreign law-making power 
by the Constitution.40 Debate rages amongst separation of pow-
ers scholars on whether the Executive Branch or Legislative 
Branch should have “primacy” over foreign affairs.41 However, in 
practice, the Supreme Court has remained deferential to both 
political branches and has largely abstained from cases involv-
ing international controversy.42  
B. JUDICIAL DOCTRINES AFFORDING DEFERENCE IN CASES 
IMPLICATING FOREIGN POLICY 
Three court-fashioned doctrines have special bearing on is-
sues of foreign policy: (1) the Political Question doctrine; (2) the 
Exhaustion principle; and (3) the Act of State doctrine. Each doc-
trine is premised on the separation of powers and the explicit 
constitutional powers granted to specific bodies of government 
 
 37. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 663–64 (explaining the traditional ra-
tionale for giving deference to the Executive Branch). 
 38. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); 
see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (noting that courts have tradi-
tionally given much deference to the concerns of the Executive Branch). But see 
Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 1230, 1245–57 (2007) (arguing against judicial deference for the Ex-
ecutive Branch in favor of scrutiny of foreign policy practice). 
 39. JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 149 (1996) (“The Con-
stitution gives the president no general right to make foreign policy. Quite the 
contrary. . . . [V]irtually every substantive constitutional power touching on for-
eign affairs is vested in Congress.”). 
 40. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power 
over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 240–41 (2001) (explaining that specific 
powers, such as the power to make laws in accordance with international law, 
challenge the view of “presidential primacy” over foreign affairs).  
 41. See id. at 237–52 (noting that supporters of executive primacy or legis-
lative primacy over foreign policy-making must rely on extratextual evidence to 
support their positions).  
 42. See Nzelibe, supra note 36, at 970 (discussing the long history of judicial 
deference to the political branches in the context of foreign affairs). 
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vis-à-vis other governmental entities.43 Courts created these ju-
dicial doctrines, born of federal foreign relations common law 
and not of statutes, in order to avoid making nuanced foreign 
relations determinations “of a kind for which the Judiciary has 
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long 
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject 
to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”44 In fear of stepping on the toes 
of the other branches, the Judiciary has created these legal doc-
trines in order to curb their exercise of judicial review because of 
their lack of foreign relations expertise, political accountability, 
and centralized decision-making.45 This Section examines how 
courts use the different judicial doctrines to evaluate cases im-
plicating foreign policy and the political branches concerns.  
1. Political Question Doctrine 
The Political Question doctrine developed during the nine-
teenth century and was first invoked in Marbury v. Madison.46 
Justice Marshall noted that the Constitution vests the President 
“with certain important political powers” that allow the Presi-
dent to exercise their own discretion subject only to the elec-
torate and “[their] own conscience.”47 Justice Marshall declared 
that these actions taken by the President, despite the Judiciary’s 
own opinion, are “political” and not subject to the power of the 
Judiciary.48 After Justice Marshall articulated that political sub-
jects are not subject to review, courts have since clarified how to 
identify a Political Question.49 The Political Question doctrine 
 
 43. See Curlet, supra note 21, at 10–72 (discussing that the heart of the 
issue for judicial deference to foreign policy decisions is separation of powers 
considerations). 
 44. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 
(1948). 
 45. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federal-
ism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1668–69 (1997) (explaining that these rationales un-
derlie the creation of the Political Question, Act of State, and other judicial doc-
trines in foreign affairs). 
 46. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 47. Id. at 165–66. 
 48. Id. at 166 (“In such cases, [these] acts are his acts; and whatever opinion 
may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, 
still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects 
are political.”).  
 49. See Seth Korman, The New Deference-Based Approach to Adjudicating 
Political Questions in Corporate ATS Cases: Potential Pitfalls and Workable 
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itself was rarely invoked from its inception50 until its revival in 
Baker v. Carr.51 Justice Brennan and the Baker Court sought to 
clarify the ambiguities and confusion surrounding the meaning 
of a political question by announcing a six-factor test.52 Accord-
ing to this approach, courts will pass upon a legal issue if: (1) the 
Constitution attributes the issue to another branch; (2) there are  
not judicially manageable standards for resolution; (3) the court 
must make a policy determination; (4) the decision shows disre-
spect to the political branches; (5) there is a need to adhere to an 
already-made political decision; or (6) there is a potential for in-
ternational embarrassment to the United States.53 While Baker 
led to clearer standards for evaluation, some argue that Baker 
has constrained the Judiciary’s ability to hear traditionally jus-
ticiable questions,54 and some note that lower courts have in-
creasingly declared justiciable issues to be political, and there-
fore, fail to hear meritorious claims.55  
The application of the Political Question doctrine in the con-
text of foreign affairs implicates different concerns than in the 
context of purely domestic disputes. While the Judiciary has 
 
Fixes, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 85, 94 (2010) (tracking the development of 
the Political Question doctrine). 
 50. Id. 
 51. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 52. Id. at 210–26. 
 53. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (“‘[1] a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy de-
termination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility 
of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potential-
ity of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question.’” (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 217)). 
 54. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested 
Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1478 (2005) (“[I]f the Court concludes that the res-
olution of certain constitutional questions would be inconsistent with proper 
performance of its essential role in our system of government, then it should 
invalidate efforts by the political branches to require it to do so.”). 
 55. See LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 82 (1990); see also Developments in the Law—The Political Question 
Doctrine, Executive Deference, and Foreign Relations, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 
1196–201 (2009) (noting that lower courts have added more factors to the Baker 
analysis and have confused the issue). 
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used the Political Question doctrine less and less in purely do-
mestic cases,56 the doctrine has remained present and at the 
forefront of foreign relations cases.57 Although employed fre-
quently, the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated how 
Baker and the Political Question doctrine should apply in cases 
regarding foreign policy-making.58 Baker recognizes that an ar-
gument can be made that “all questions touching foreign rela-
tions are political questions . . . [y]et it is error to suppose that 
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies be-
yond judicial cognizance.”59 However, the Supreme Court has 
not given instruction in relation to these three unique chal-
lenges: (1) how to weigh traditional judicial deference to the po-
litical branches, especially the Executive Branch; (2) how to in-
corporate legal standards derived from international law; and (3) 
how to determine the risk of harm to the international reputa-
tion of the United States during litigation of foreign relations 
cases.60 Consequently, Baker ’s indeterminate Political Question 
doctrine factors have led to much confusion and unpredictable 
outcomes.61 
Legal scholars have attempted to simplify the Baker factors 
to distill the Supreme Court’s goals and aims in foreign policy 
 
 56. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of 
the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 237, 239–73, 300–19 (2002) (discussing and tracking the judicial move-
ment away from using the Political Question doctrine). 
 57. Id. at 329 (“[T]he political question doctrine has remained more vibrant 
in the foreign relations context than in the domestic context . . . .”); Bradley, su-
pra note 20, at 660 (“[A]lthough this ‘pure’ version of the political question doc-
trine has waned substantially in recent years as a general matter, it still ap-
pears to have some force in the foreign affairs area.”). 
 58. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL AN-
SWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 10–30 (1992) (iden-
tifying the inconsistent applications of the Political Question doctrine in cases 
implicating foreign affairs). 
 59. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). Some circuit courts, such as 
the Second Circuit, have articulated that “an assertion of the political question 
doctrine by the Executive Branch . . . would not necessarily preclude adjudica-
tion.” Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 60. See Lisa Rudikoff Price, Banishing the Specter of Judicial Foreign Pol-
icymaking: A Competence-Based Approach to the Political Question Doctrine, 38 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 323, 335–36 (2006) (describing the unique challenges 
that foreign relations cases pose to the Political Question doctrine). 
 61. See Korman, supra note 49, at 95.  
  
2020] ALIEN TORT STATUTE 1657 
 
cases. The first three factors are commonly classified as the “ju-
dicially manageable standards” or “prudential” requirement of 
the Political Question doctrine.62 The judicially manageable 
standards concern themselves with judicial restraint, making 
sure that courts rely on the Constitution, law, or statute to jus-
tify their conduct or legal analysis rather than inserting the Ju-
diciary’s foreign policy preference.63 The last three factors are 
the “respect” requirement or “international reputation” require-
ment within the context of foreign relations cases.64 Recognizing 
that “the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
representative of the nation,”65 courts will give considerable 
weight to the Executive’s views when the Political Question doc-
trine is invoked in the context of foreign affairs.66 Executive 
statements, therefore, have much bearing on the court’s evalua-
tion of the respect requirement, especially the embarrassment 
assessment of the Baker factors.67 This two-part simplification 
by legal scholars may provide guidance in discerning the Su-
preme Court’s messy Political Question doctrine application. 
 
 62. See id. at 109 (“[T]he first three Baker factors . . . are reduced to the 
question of whether the matter before the court is a violation of international 
law . . . .”); Nzelibe, supra note 36, at 963 (“The most widely cited prudential or 
institutional competence factor involves the claim that the disputed issue 
‘lack[s] . . . judicially discoverable and manageable standards.’” (alterations in 
original)); Stewart Pollock, A Political Embarrassment: Jurisdiction and the Al-
ien Tort Statute, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and Political Question Doc-
trine, 51 CAL. W. L. REV. 225, 242 (2015) (“The first three parts of the Baker test 
concern the separation of powers . . . .”). 
 63. See Nzelibe, supra note 36, at 962–65 (explaining the significance of the 
prudential requirement for judicial restraint). 
 64. See Korman, supra note 49, at 109 (“[T]he last three Baker fac-
tors . . . are really three separate ways of asking the question of whether adju-
dication infringes on the executive’s ability to conduct the nation’s foreign af-
fairs.”); Pollock, supra note 62, at 242 (“[T]he last three [parts of the Baker test] 
concern issues of respect.”); Price, supra note 60, at 336 (“[T]he risk of harm to 
the international reputation of the United States is thought to come into play 
in foreign relations cases, implicating the final three Baker factors.”); The Polit-
ical Question Doctrine, supra note 55, at 1196 (noting that the courts are par-
ticularly interested in the three respect factors). 
 65. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
 66. See Thomas R. Sutcliffe, Note, “The Nile Reconstituted”: Executive 
Statements, International Human Rights Litigation, and the Political Question 
Doctrine, 89 B.U. L. REV. 295, 301 (2009). 
 67. See id. (explaining the weight courts should give to executive state-
ments). 
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2. The Exhaustion Principle 
The Exhaustion principle requires a claimant to first seek 
relief in a forum where the harm occurred.68 Under international 
law, states are not required to hear claims by foreign nationals 
until they have exhausted all of their domestic remedies, unless 
the state does not offer adequate remedies.69 The judicial doc-
trine originated within international jurisprudence and is cus-
tomary international law.70 Within the international arena, the 
International Court of Justice first recognized the Exhaustion 
principle in the Interhandel Case.71 The International Court of 
Justice held that before a national could bring action against an-
other state outside the forum of the respective state, the Exhaus-
tion principle allows “the State where the violation oc-
curred . . . [to] have an opportunity to redress [the violation] by 
its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal 
system.”72 Within the American context, the Supreme Court first 
announced the principle of Exhaustion in Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino.73 The Court in Sabbatino noted that foreign 
individuals seeking relief in American courts normally should 
exhaust local remedies before looking for a remedy outside the 
borders of where the conduct took place.74 Remedies can include 
and are not limited to judicial, administrative, and legislative 
 
 68. Regina Waugh, Note, Exhaustion of Remedies and the Alien Tort Stat-
ute, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 555, 556 (2010) (explaining the Exhaustion of Rem-
edies principle). 
 69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 713 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Under international law, ordinarily 
a state is not required to consider a claim by another state for an injury to its 
national until that person has exhausted domestic remedies, unless such reme-
dies are clearly sham or inadequate, or their application is unreasonably pro-
longed.”). 
 70. See Emeka Duruigbo, Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Alien Tort Liti-
gation: Implications for International Human Rights Protection, 29 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1245, 1247–50 (2006) (tracking the historical roots of the Exhaustion 
principle). 
 71. Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27 (Mar. 21). 
 72. Id. 
 73. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 74. Id. at 422–23 (“Because of its peculiar nation-to-nation character the 
usual method for an individual to seek relief is to exhaust local remedies and 
then repair to the executive authorities of his own state to persuade them to 
champion his claim in diplomacy or before an international tribunal.”). 
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remedies.75 The Exhaustion principle provides a procedural cau-
tion rooted in both international and domestic law. 
3. Act of State Doctrine 
The Act of State doctrine prevents plaintiffs from “inquiring 
into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign 
power committed within its own territory.”76 The Supreme Court 
offered its rationale behind the doctrine in Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino.77 The doctrine reflects the Judiciary’s hesi-
tancy to engage “in the task of passing on the validity of foreign 
acts of state” because it “may hinder rather than further this 
country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community 
of nations as a whole in the international sphere.”78 The purpose 
of the Act of State doctrine is to balance relevant considerations 
to determine if a court’s decision would impede the Executive’s 
ability to engage in foreign affairs.79 The Supreme Court offered 
three such factors in order to determine the court’s ability to ad-
judicate: (1) “the degree of codification or consensus concerning 
a particular area of international law”; (2) whether there are 
“important . . . implications of an issue . . . for our foreign rela-
tions”; and (3) whether “the government which perpetrated the 
challenged [A]ct of [S]tate is no longer in existence.”80 However, 
the Supreme Court made clear that the factors were not to be 
interpreted as “an inflexible and all-encompassing rule.”81  
The rationale behind the Act of State doctrine is rooted in 
political considerations rather than within international law.82 
The Judiciary was concerned with issues of foreign sovereignty 
 
 75. See Duruigbo, supra note 70, at 1249 (noting that a variety of remedial 
types must be exhausted). 
 76. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401. The original formulation of the Act of State 
doctrine is “the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the 
government of another done within its own territory.” Underhill v. Hernandez, 
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
 77. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421–27. 
 78. Id. at 423. 
 79. Sutcliffe, supra note 66, at 322. 
 80. Id. (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428). 
 81. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.  
 82. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common 
Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85–88 (2009) (noting that the Act of State 
doctrine is rooted in constitutional arguments rather than a reflection of inter-
national law practices). 
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infringement.83 However, it is important to note that the Act of 
State doctrine does not categorically bar all suits involving a con-
tested action by a foreign sovereign.84 In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. 
v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,85 the Supreme Court clarified 
that the doctrine applies only “when a court must decide—that 
is, when the outcome of the case turns upon—the effect of official 
action by a foreign sovereign.”86 The Supreme Court made a dis-
tinction between inquiring about the legality of a foreign action 
and the validity of a foreign action; legality of an action would be 
in reference to applicable American law, while validity of a for-
eign official action would be in reference to the foreign political 
and legal mechanisms through which official acts were decided 
and executed.87 Respecting the validity of an official foreign act 
promoted the aversion of international conflict and prevention of 
undermining foreign government political processes by Ameri-
can courts.88 The Act of State doctrine provides a procedural av-
enue for courts to avoid direct contestation of foreign state ac-
tion. 
C. THE HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
The ATS was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.89 The ATS 
allows for internationally-recognized torts to be recognized in 
American courts.90 The federal statute reads simply as: “[t]he 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
 
 83. See id. But see Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to 
Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 1921, 1960 (2003) (arguing that twentieth century concepts of national 
sovereignty immunity need to be changed in light of twenty-first century inter-
national commitments). 
 84. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 719–21 (addressing the post-Sabbatino 
decision approach to the Act of State doctrine). 
 85. 493 U.S. 400 (1990). 
 86. Id. at 406 (emphasis omitted). 
 87. Id. at 409 (“The [A]ct of [S]tate doctrine does not establish an exception 
for cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign governments, but 
merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns 
taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.”). 
 88. See Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Interna-
tionalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1940 (1992) 
(arguing that the Act of State doctrine promotes harmony of international rela-
tions rather than harmony of international law). 
 89. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). 
 90. Id. at 719–20. 
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by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”91 The First Congress 
enacted the jurisdictional grant following two international inci-
dents involving foreign diplomats.92 First, in 1784, French diplo-
mat Francois de Barbee Marbois was insulted and physically as-
saulted by a French national in Philadelphia.93 The 
Pennsylvania state court refused to subject the diplomat’s at-
tacker to international law, remedy, and extradition.94 Second, 
Dutch diplomat Pieter Johan van Berckel had his diplomatic 
party searched by a New York law enforcement officer in viola-
tion of basic diplomatic privileges.95 When pleading to then 
American foreign affairs secretary John Jay, Jay responded that 
“the foederal [sic] Government does not appear . . . to be vested 
with any judicial Powers competent to the Cognizance and Judg-
ment of such Cases.”96 In order to gain international legitimacy 
and gain admission into the European-based system of sovereign 
nations, Congress enacted the ATS.97 The statute gave a civil 
cause of action for foreign plaintiffs and domestic recognition of 
international law; however, foreign plaintiffs rarely invoked the 
ATS for nearly 200 years.98  
 
 91. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). 
 92. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute 
and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 466–67 (2011) (chronicling the 
events leading up to the passage of the ATS).  
 93. Id. at 467. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. John Jay, in 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789 
111, 111 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1937). 
 97. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The 
Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of Interna-
tional Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 935–36 (2010) (explaining the im-
portance for a young American government to gain international recognition); 
see also Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 481–88 (1989) (arguing that the 
ATS was passed for the purposes of national security, national duty to propa-
gate and enforce international law, and the honoring of state practice and the 
international arena). 
 98. See Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate 
Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive En-
gagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 211 (2008). Three prominent cases have 
been brought under the ATS: IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(rejecting a claim brought under the ATS for theft within a transnational secu-
rities transaction); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (involving a 
potential violation of passport control laws in an international child custody 
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The operative phrase within the ATS is “committed in vio-
lation of the law of nations.”99 The “law of nations” is a dynamic 
term; it refers to customary international law incorporated as 
part of federal common law.100 The eighteenth century concep-
tion of the law of nations was nuanced and had multiple, concur-
rent meanings.101 The law of nations was: (1) “a broad term for 
all international law”; (2) “included principles of domestic law 
perceived to be shared by all civilized nations”; (3) “a source of 
the U.S. law of federalism”; and (4) “perceived in part as unwrit-
ten natural law.”102 While the law of nations in the eighteenth 
century was a complex idea, customary international law today 
is defined as “a general and consistent practice of states followed 
by them from a sense of legal obligation.”103 Customary interna-
tional law requires state practice, a sense of legal obligation, and 
a substantial period of time passed in order for a practice to be-
come legally binding.104 Initially, customary international law 
governed conduct between states, diplomats, and the regulation 
of the seas.105 Post-World War II brought forth a dramatic trans-
 
case); and Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1785) (involving a French 
captain attempting to recover slaves he had captured from a Spanish ship). In 
Vencap, the court called the statute “a kind of legal Lohengrin . . . no one seems 
to know whence it came.” 519 F.2d at 1015. 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). 
 100. See Thomas H. Lee, The Law of Nations and the Judicial Branch, 106 
GEO. L.J. 1707, 1709 (2018) (“The law of nations was the original federal com-
mon law.”). Although courts have accepted this argument for the sake of bring-
ing ATS suits, there is still lively debate within legal scholarship if the ATS is 
constitutionally consistent with the Erie doctrine. For a discussion, compare 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 
852–70 (1997) (arguing that the Erie doctrine prevents the Courts from apply-
ing customary international law without further authorization from Congress), 
with William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Le-
gitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 21–25 (2007) (arguing that the founding gen-
eration of judges understood that customary international law would be incor-
porated regardless of Congressional authorization). 
 101. See Lee, supra note 100, at 1716. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 100, at 817–18. 
 104. Id. at 838–39.  
 105. Id. at 818 (“Historically, CIL [customary international law] governed 
relations among nations, such as the treatment of diplomats and the rules of 
war.”). 
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formation with the recognition of individuals and the rise of hu-
man rights.106 New international organizations, treaties, and 
state practices created an international human rights regime 
and recognition of new individual rights.107 In the course of cen-
turies of international law, international human rights law is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.108  
With the development of new customary international law 
practices and human rights jurisprudence, the ATS incorporated 
human rights for the first time in 1980 in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala.109 In Filartiga, the family of Joelito Filartiga sued a Para-
guayan police officer, Americo Pena-Irala, who tortured and 
killed Filartiga, under the ATS.110 Initially, the district court dis-
missed the case, feeling obligated to “construe narrowly ‘the law 
of nations,’ . . . as excluding that law which governs a state’s 
treatment of its own citizens.”111 However, the Second Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision on the grounds that inter-
national law clearly prohibits state-sponsored torture.112 The 
high-profile Filartiga decision reinvigorated human rights advo-
cates and signaled to the world that United States courts would 
provide a forum for victims of human rights abuses.113 
Following Filartiga, plaintiffs filed hundreds of federal 
cases under the ATS.114 Defendants have ranged from foreign 
 
 106. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights 
of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (1982) (tracking 
the historical development of international human rights law). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. (noting that human rights was not legally recognized until the mid-
twentieth century).  
 109. 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). Notably, plaintiffs could not bring hu-
man rights claims under customary international law until recently because 
human rights law did not exist for much of the ATS’s existence. See supra notes 
106–08 and accompanying text. 
 110. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878–79. 
 111. Id. at 880.  
 112. Id. at 884–85. 
 113. See Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Divining Bal-
ancing Factors from Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern” Test, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 443, 
446–47 (2015) (“The ATS is, at least operatively, a human rights statute.”); Kor-
man, supra note 49, at 91–92.  
 114. See Korman, supra note 49, at 92. Following Filartiga, many Holocaust 
survivors brought ATS claims against Swiss banks within United States courts. 
For a brief description of the ATS litigation, see MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLO-
CAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS 54–58 
(2003). 
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governments115 to multinational corporations.116 In corporate 
ATS cases, foreign plaintiffs brought federal lawsuits against 
corporate defendants for either complicit or direct liability for vi-
olations of customary international law.117 While foreign govern-
ments would routinely escape liability by invoking a tortured 
sovereign immunity analysis or complex Act of State doctrine ap-
plication,118 corporations did not enjoy the same luxury. Instead, 
corporations brought to federal court under the ATS have as-
serted that they were not subject to federal jurisdiction due to 
foreign policy implications.119 Disgruntled multinational corpo-
rations and the Bush Administration in the early 2000s pro-
ceeded to put pressure on the Supreme Court to invalidate or 
narrow the ATS.120 Even questions about the validity of the ATS 
from legal scholars121 contributed to an inevitable clash between 
the ATS and the Supreme Court at the turn of the twenty-first 
century. 
II.  REMOVING EFFECTIVENESS: THE SUPREME COURT 
SEVERELY LIMITS THE REACH OF THE ATS   
Beginning in 2004 with Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,122 the Su-
preme Court began to curtail the broadly and inconsistently-ap-
plied ATS. Over the next fourteen years, the Supreme Court 
used the rhetoric of “foreign policy consequences” in order to: (1) 
create judicially manageable standards for the types of actions 
that can be brought forward;123 (2) bar lawsuits alleging human 
 
 115. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (suing Libya under the ATS). 
 116. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (suing Un-
ocal Corp. under the ATS). 
 117. Korman, supra note 49, at 93. 
 118. Id. at 92. 
 119. Id. at 96–97. 
 120. See Richard Herz, Text of Remarks: Corporate Alien Tort Liability and 
the Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 76, 76 (2006) (“[T]he Bush Ad-
ministration has vigorously opposed the use of complicity liability in Alien Tort 
Statute litigation. Actually, they vigorously opposed any use of the Alien Tort 
Statute whatsoever. They lost that issue before the Supreme Court two years 
ago in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. Now, they are attempting to do retail what they 
were unable to do wholesale, by attacking various aspects of the Alien Tort Stat-
ute . . . .”). 
 121. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  
 122. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 123. Id. at 725, 727–28. 
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rights violations that took place in foreign jurisdictions;124 and 
(3) eliminate the liability of foreign corporations.125 Section II.A 
explores the three seminal ATS cases decided by the Supreme 
Court and its use of foreign policy doctrine. Section II.B exam-
ines the pitfalls of the inflexible approaches in the Supreme 
Court’s two most recent ATS opinions. It argues that the Su-
preme Court’s strict elimination of ATS cases based on hard-line 
rules undermines the flexibility needed to promote the separa-
tion of powers. 
A. THE SUPREME COURT DEFINES THE PARAMETERS OF 
BRINGING ATS CASES AFTER TWO DECADES OF LITIGATION 
Section II.A. tracks current Supreme Court ATS jurispru-
dence, taking special notice of the restrictive rules placed on ATS 
suits by the Court. Section II.A.1 details Sosa v. Alvarez-Mach-
ain and the court-mandated qualifications to recognize a cause 
of action under the ATS.126 Section II.A.2 explores Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and the “touch and concern” require-
ment to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
which represents the first bright-line rule the Court applied to 
the ATS.127 Section II.A.3 analyzes the most recent restriction 
placed upon the ATS by the Court in Jesner v. Arab Bank, which 
ruled that foreign corporations cannot be liable under the 
ATS.128  
1. Defining Causes of Action Under the ATS  
In 1985, an American DEA agent was captured, tortured, 
and murdered while on assignment in Mexico.129 Alvarez-Mach-
ain, a Mexican physician, attended the torture of the DEA agent 
and allegedly kept the agent alive for further torture.130 A Cali-
fornia district court indicted Alvarez-Machain for torture and 
 
 124. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013). 
 125. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018). 
 126. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 127. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25. 
 128. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1403.  
 129. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697. 
 130. Id.  
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murder, and the DEA asked for the Mexican government to as-
sist in his recovery.131 When the Mexican government denied as-
sistance, the DEA orchestrated and executed a plan to have Mex-
ican nationals kidnap and transport Alvarez-Machain to the 
United States to stand trial.132 Following acquittal of his crimi-
nal charges, Alvarez-Machain brought a civil suit under the ATS 
against his Mexican kidnappers and the American DEA agents 
who coordinated the kidnapping.133 The district court awarded 
Alvarez-Machain $25,000 in damages, and the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed.134  
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held 
that Alvarez-Machain could not recover under the ATS.135 The 
majority determined that, although the ATS is written in terms 
of a jurisdictional grant, the drafting Congress sought to have 
courts hear common law claims defined under the “law of na-
tions.”136 However, in order to successfully identify a private ac-
tion under the modern-day law of nations, courts must only rec-
ognize private claims that “rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century para-
digms we have recognized.”137 Specifically, the Court used the 
three central eighteenth-century international law violations—
“violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambas-
sadors, and piracy”—as examples of specific international law 
norms widely accepted.138 The Supreme Court also praised the 
 
 131. Id. at 697–98. 
 132. Id. at 698. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 699. 
 135. Id. at 697.  
 136. Id. at 729–31. The United States argued that the ATS was purely juris-
dictional and required further congressional action. See Brief for the United 
States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 6–8, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-
339), 2004 WL 182581, at *35 (arguing that without a congressional grant of 
action, recognition of private causes of action would violate the separation of 
powers). 
 137. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.  
 138. Id. at 724 (relying on Blackstone to understand what the First Con-
gress’s understanding of the law of nations was). But see Eugene Kontorovich, 
Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits 
of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004) (analyzing the 
international law against piracy and finding that the historical paradigms of 
piracy make it difficult for judges to recognize modern customary international 
law norms). 
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lower courts’ articulable standards of requiring international 
law norms to be “specific, universal, and obligatory.”139 Ulti-
mately, because Alvarez-Machain could not identify any custom-
ary international law or treaties that recognized arbitrary arrest 
within the same historical paradigms when the ATS was en-
acted, he did not have a cause of action and could not bring suit 
under the ATS.140 
Along with general concerns of encroaching on the Erie doc-
trine’s ban on federal common law causes of action141 and fears 
of acting in a quasi-legislative fashion,142 the Court’s chief con-
cern was allowing non-existent or less-established international 
causes of action forward.143 These ill-defined causes of actions 
would have “potential implications for the foreign relations of 
the United States . . . [and] imping[e] on the discretion of the 
Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign af-
fairs.”144 The majority noted that modern development of inter-
national law concerns itself with holding states and foreign 
agents accountable, a task that the Court found would “raise 
risks of adverse foreign policy consequences.”145 The majority 
 
 139. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (defining actions as “definable, universal and ob-
ligatory norms” (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring))); In re Estate of Marcos Human 
Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Actionable violations of inter-
national law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.”). 
 140. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733–38 (detailing that the international community 
had not recognized arbitrary arrest as a universally accepted law norm). 
 141. Id. at 726 (explaining the “significant rethinking” of the ability of fed-
eral courts to create a federal general common law (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938))). 
 142. Id. at 727 (“[T]his Court has recently and repeatedly said that a decision 
to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the 
great majority of cases.”).  
 143. See id. at 725. 
 144. Id. at 727. 
 145. Id. at 728; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (criticizing the notion that the ATS should 
allow “our courts [to] sit in judgment of the conduct of foreign officials in their 
own countries with respect to their own citizens”). But see Brief of Career For-
eign Service Diplomats as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Sosa, 542 
U.S. 692 (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 419428, at *11–17 (arguing that the U.S. has 
significant foreign policy interests in supporting human rights, complying with 
internationally-recognized individual rights, and allowing the Executive 
Branch to endorse ATS litigation).  
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suggested that case-specific deference may and should be ap-
plied in ATS cases, subject to the Executive’s view of the case.146 
Additionally, both the majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence suggested that the Exhaustion principle may ap-
ply.147 However, the Court failed to clarify or mandate the use of 
case-specific deference and the Exhaustion principle.148 Alt-
hough the Court clarified which international law actions can be 
brought, it failed to instruct the lower courts what the role of 
traditional judicial doctrines should be during the course of ATS 
litigation. 
2. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality  
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,149 Kiobel and other 
residents in the Niger delta protested the environmental impact 
of oil exploration by Shell Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria, Ltd. (Shell), owned by Royal Dutch Petroleum Company 
in the Netherlands and Shell Transport and Trading Company, 
p.l.c. in England.150 Shell enlisted the Nigerian military and po-
lice forces for security, who allegedly attacked villages and 
killed, raped, and arrested residents.151 Following the atrocities 
committed by Nigerian forces, Kiobel moved to the United States 
and subsequently sued the three companies under the ATS.152 
The Second Circuit dismissed the complaint in its entirety, hold-
ing that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liabil-
ity.153 However, the Supreme Court circumvented the question 
of corporate liability and asked whether ATS suits may be 
brought for conduct arising entirely outside of the United 
States.154  
 
 146. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.  
 147. Id. at 733 n.21, 760 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The Court also suggests 
that principles of exhaustion might apply . . . .”); see also Beth Stephens, Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in 
U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 562 n.138 (2004) (suggesting that challeng-
ing ATS litigation on the basis of the Exhaustion principle may be the most 
appropriate challenge in some cases). 
 148. See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692. 
 149. 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
 150. Id. at 113. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 114. 
 154. Id. (posing the question “[w]hether and under what circumstances the 
[ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of 
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second Cir-
cuit to dismiss the ATS suit, finding the ATS does not apply ex-
traterritorially.155 The Court relied on the statutory canon 
known as the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion.156 The presumption against extraterritorial application is 
the presumption that American law “governs domestically but 
does not rule the world,” which works to avoid conflicts between 
the domestic law of the United States and the law of other na-
tions.157 Although the Court noted that the presumption typi-
cally applies to Acts of Congress regulating conduct abroad,158 
the majority found the concern of judicial interference into for-
eign policy compelling enough to justify the application of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.159 The Court found that 
the statutory language,160 legislative history,161 and historical 
context162 did not rebut the presumption against extraterritorial 
application of the ATS for conduct occurring in a foreign terri-
tory. Justice Roberts argued that extraterritorial application of 
the ATS leads to foreign policy blunders, pointing to the long list 
of objections by foreign states in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.163 
 
nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United 
States.” (second alteration in original)). 
 155. Id. at 124–25. 
 156. Id. at 115. 
 157. Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)). 
 158. Id. at 116 (“We typically apply the presumption to discern whether an 
Act of Congress regulating conduct applies abroad. . . . The ATS, on the other 
hand, is strictly jurisdictional.” (internal citations omitted)). But see id. at 127, 
133 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (arguing against the use of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality and that the ATS can have extraterritorial applica-
tion in cases where “distinct American interests are at issue” as determined by 
existing judicial limiting principles such as case-specific deference). 
 159. Id. at 117 (majority opinion) (“These concerns are not diminished by the 
fact that Sosa limited federal courts to recognizing causes of action only for al-
leged violations of international law norms that are ‘specific, universal, and ob-
ligatory.’” (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004))).  
 160. Id. at 118 (explaining that the generic language of “any” in “any civil 
action” does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
 161. Id. at 119–23 (arguing that the three principal offenses against the law 
of nations did not involve the application of extraterritoriality).  
 162. Id. at 123–24 (finding that the passage of the ATS was to supply judicial 
relief to foreign dignitaries injured within the United States). 
 163. Id. at 124 (noting objections of Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Papua 
New Guinea, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (citing Doe v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissent-
ing in part))). Other foreign states directly stated their objection to applying the 
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Even claims that “touch and concern the territory of the United 
States” must “displace the presumption” with “sufficient 
force.”164 The Kiobel decision closed the door for any ATS cases 
involving purely foreign conduct to be brought forward. 
Although concurring in the judgement, four of the justices 
disagreed with the inflexible rule applied by the majority.165 Not-
ing that Sosa suggested deferential practices and the Exhaus-
tion principle,166 Justice Breyer suggested finding jurisdiction 
where “distinct American interests are at issue.”167 Keeping the 
ATS available for application extraterritorially preserves the 
United States’ interest in “not becoming a safe harbor for viola-
tors” and “compensating those who have suffered harm at [their] 
hands.”168 Other nations routinely allow foreign plaintiffs to 
bring suits against other nationals in their courts, and national 
courts have taken the responsibility of recognizing international 
claims that fall under universal jurisdiction.169 Limiting princi-
ples, such as the Exhaustion principle and deferential weight to 
the Executive Branch, would further limit the possibility of a for-
eign blunder.170 Ultimately, the concurrence argued that using 
existing judicial doctrine in foreign relations law more readily 
 
ATS extraterritorially. See, e.g., Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, 10, Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108 (No. 10-
1491), 2012 WL 379578, at *1, *10 (noting concern of extraterritorial application 
of the ATS); see also Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Ex-
traterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 874 (2009) (warning that the growing 
extraterritorial application of law is unilateral imposition that undermines con-
sent-based rules). 
 164. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25 (noting specifically that multinational cor-
porations are present in the United States, and “it would reach too far to say 
that mere corporate presence suffices” to displace the presumption). But see 
Doyle, supra note 113, at 445–46 (noting that the Supreme Court did not define 
the “touch and concern” test and offering a balancing test application of the 
“touch and concern” test based on the Court’s dicta). 
 165. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (“Unlike the 
Court, I would not invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather, 
[I would be] guided in part by principles and practices of foreign relations 
law . . . .”). 
 166. Id. at 128. 
 167. Id. at 133. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 136–37; see also Anthony J. Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and 
the Law of Nations in Kiobel and Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1329, 1339–41 
(2013) (finding the law of nations recognizes universal jurisdiction and Kiobel’s 
ruling is in direct conflict with the ATS). 
 170. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 133 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). 
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adjusts for foreign policy preferences of the political branches 
and is more harmonious with international practices.171  
3. The Elimination of Foreign Corporate Liability Under the 
ATS  
In Jesner v. Arab Bank, foreign nationals from the Middle 
East, including the named plaintiff, Jesner, pled that they and 
their families were victims injured and killed by terrorist acts 
during a ten-year period.172 Jesner sued Arab Bank, PLC under 
the ATS for laundering money on the behalf of the terrorists who 
perpetuated the attacks.173 Arab Bank allegedly helped fund Ha-
mas and their terrorist activities in part by transmitting money 
through its New York City offices by electronic transfer.174 The 
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the ATS 
claim could not be brought, but there was a significant split in 
reasoning with respect to the justification for the dismissal.175 
The majority concluded that the ATS did not apply to corpora-
tions because international criminal tribunals have limited their 
jurisdiction to natural persons.176 The concurrence found that in-
ternational law recognized civil corporate liability in this in-
stance, but used Kiobel’s presumption against extraterritoriality 
framework to hold that there was no relevant conduct within the 
United States that could support a claim in a federal district 
court.177 Foregoing the rule against extraterritoriality applica-
tion from Kiobel, the Supreme Court then turned to the question 
of corporate liability and created a new rule. 
 
 171. Id. at 139 (“Thus, the jurisdictional approach that I would use is analo-
gous to, and consistent with, the approaches of a number of other nations.”). For 
a discussion of the different rationales that could be used to justify Kiobel’s rule 
against extraterritoriality application, see David L. Sloss, Kiobel and Extrater-
ritoriality: A Rule Without a Rationale, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 241, 255 (2013) (argu-
ing that the Court’s rationale for applying the bar on extraterritoriality appli-
cation of the ATS should have led to a different outcome). 
 172. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018). 
 173. Id. at 1394–95. 
 174. Id. Arab Bank argued that the CHIPS system that transferred the 
money electronically did not pass the “touch and concern” test because it oc-
curred purely as a mechanical function without human intervention in the 
“blink of an eye.” See id. at 1394–95, 1406. 
 175. Id. at 1395. 
 176. Id. at 1395–96. 
 177. Id. at 1396. The concurrence noted that civil corporate liability under 
the ATS was recognized by the Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuit 
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In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme 
Court decided that the ATS did not apply to foreign corpora-
tions.178 Justice Kennedy used three justifications. First, inter-
national criminal tribunal charters only recognized criminal lia-
bility for natural persons, not corporations.179 Second, in the 
ATS’s vagueness, separation of powers dictated that the Su-
preme Court should not decide if foreign corporations may be 
sued; it should be left to the political branches to decide the for-
eign policy.180 Third, if the Supreme Court recognized jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations, it would open up multinational 
corporations to liability,181 strain American relationships with 
foreign nations,182 and open up liability for American companies 
investing abroad.183 Justice Kennedy claimed that, like the rule 
 
Courts of Appeals. Id. (citing Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1020–22 
(9th Cir. 2014); Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017–21 
(7th Cir. 2011); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40–55 (D.C. Cir. 
2011)). 
 178. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407 (“[T]he Court holds that foreign corporations 
may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS.”). Debate rages within 
legal scholarship if international law applies to corporations. For a discussion 
of whether international law recognizes corporate liability, compare Eli Buk-
span & Asa Kasher, Human Rights in the Private Sphere: Corporations First, 
40 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 419, 419–20 (2019) (using moral arguments to posit that 
human rights law should apply to corporations and that the international com-
munity should provide a remedy), and Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Cor-
porations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Re-
ally Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1094–95 (2009) (arguing that international 
corporate liability has been recognized since the Nuremberg trials), with Julian 
G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A 
Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 353 (2011) (argu-
ing that, in the absence of a clearly recognized customary international law 
norm recognizing corporate liability, the ATS should not apply to corporations). 
 179. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1400–01. But see id. at 1401 (conceding that there 
are both national and special tribunals that recognize civil liability); Oona A. 
Hathaway et al., What Is a War Crime?, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 53, 104 (2019) (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court’s holding in Jesner “reflects persistent confusion 
created by overreliance on the jurisdiction of particular international tribunals 
in the ATS context”). 
 180. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402–03.  
 181. Id. at 1405. 
 182. Id. at 1406–07 (noting past objections for ATS suits by sovereign na-
tions); see, e.g., Brief for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 1–3, Jesner, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (No. 16-499), 2017 WL 
3726004 (arguing that its sovereignty, its economic stability linked to Arab 
Bank, and its working relationship with the United States to combat terrorism 
would be in jeopardy).  
 183. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407. 
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against extraterritoriality application of the ATS, elimination of 
foreign corporate liability under the ATS served the purpose of 
judicial deference to the political branches in cases implicating 
foreign policy.184 
In the dissent, the remaining four Justices argued that the 
text, purpose, and history of the ATS allows foreign corporate 
liability.185 Justice Sotomayor explained that “[n]othing about 
the corporate form in itself raises foreign-policy concerns.”186 The 
dissent argued that the ATS is concerned with the substantive 
conduct of public and private actors, not the kind of actor.187 The 
dissent addressed the foreign policy implications raised by the 
majority and concurrences in three fashions. First, Justice So-
tomayor explained that the First Congress authorized district 
courts under the ATS to consider new claims as treaty laws and 
international obligations develop.188 Second, the United States 
had an interest in upholding international law and, therefore, 
providing remedies for international violations.189 Third, the ma-
jority committed a logical fallacy in concluding that, because the 
corporation at issue in this case had close ties to their respective 
national economy, all foreign corporations have close affiliations 
with their host nation, and thus all corporations deserve immun-
ity from the ATS due to foreign policy implications.190 Corpora-
tions may violate international law independent of a foreign 
 
 184. Id. at 1407–08. 
 185. Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 1420–21. 
 188. Id. at 1427; see also Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Cost of Territoriality: Jus 
Cogens Claims Against Corporations, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 225, 231–33 
(2018) (arguing that precluding foreign corporate liability is directly incompat-
ible with the enforcement of jus cogens norms, to which all international actors 
are subjected).  
 189. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1428 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Brief of 
United States Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Lindsey Graham as Amici Cu-
riae in Support of Petitioners at *2, Jesner, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (No. 16-499), 2017 
WL 2822776 (noting that the recognition of corporate liability under the ATS is 
a “substantial part in Congress’s plan for keeping U.S. financial instrumentali-
ties off-limits to terrorist operations overseas.”); Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at *8–24, Jesner, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (No. 
16-499), 2017 WL 2792284 (arguing that international law recognized corporate 
civil liability and that the enacting Congress knew that corporations could be 
violators of international law).  
 190. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1429–31 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The Kingdom 
of Jordan raised the contention that Arab Bank constituted “between one-fifth 
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state,191 and there are judicial tools, specifically the use of Ex-
haustion principle, that will disaggregate the specific interna-
tional friction that arises.192 Ultimately, categorically barring 
foreign corporate liability for human rights abuses under the 
ATS would inflame international tensions that the ATS hoped to 
avoid.193 
B. CURRENT INFLEXIBLE ATS JURISPRUDENCE UNDERMINES 
THE ABILITY OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES TO ENGAGE IN 
FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING 
In the three ATS cases brought to the Supreme Court, the 
Court took two approaches: either the implementation of a flex-
ible evaluative framework or the articulation of non-negotiable 
rules creating uncompromising barriers to litigation.194 While 
Sosa offered judicially manageable standards to evaluate ATS 
claims,195 the Court’s hard-line rules eliminating extraterritori-
ality applicability196 and foreign corporation liability197 closed 
avenues for international human rights redress and undermined 
the very separation of powers principles it claims to protect. As 
discussed in Part I, the Constitution gives the ability to engage 
in foreign policy-making to the Legislative and Executive 
Branches, excluding judges and courts entirely.198 However, as 
Justice Brennan observed in Baker v. Carr, “it is error to suppose 
that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations 
lies beyond judicial cognizance.”199 The current inflexible frame-
work of the ATS undermines the ability of the political branches 
to engage in foreign policy-making in the following three ways: 
(1) it fails to take into account the dynamic nature of the statute 
 
and one-third of the total market capitalization of the Amman Stock Exchange.” 
Id. at 1394 (majority opinion). 
 191. Id. at 1429–30 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. at 1430–31 (“Courts also can dismiss ATS suits for a plaintiff ’s fail-
ure to exhaust the remedies available in her domestic forum . . . or when asked 
to do so by the State Department.”). 
 193. See id. at 1431 (“Foreclosing foreign corporate liability in all ATS ac-
tions, irrespective of circumstance or norm, is simply too broad a response to 
case-specific concerns that can be addressed via other means.”).  
 194. See supra Part II.A. 
 195. See supra Part II.A.1.  
 196. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 197. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 198. See supra Part I.A.  
 199. 369 U.S. 186, 211–12 (1962). 
  
2020] ALIEN TORT STATUTE 1675 
 
itself, and, more specifically, the constantly changing “law of na-
tions”; (2) it falsely equates unilateral curtailment of the statute 
as practicing judicial deference; and (3) it hampers the effective-
ness of the political branches to stay human rights compliant. 
1. The Law of Nations Is Not Static 
The law of nations is not static; customary international law 
is always changing.200 As discussed earlier, international law 
has developed in dramatic fashion since the enactment of the 
ATS.201 Current customary international law is different from 
the law of nations in 1789.202 International human rights law 
has arguably progressed the most, especially since its establish-
ment following World War II, the rise of international human 
rights organizations, and the re-shifting of international law 
from the rights of states to individual rights.203 It is for this very 
reason that flexibility is needed in the evaluation of the law of 
nations when ATS claims are brought.204 While bright-line rules 
promote consistency and predictability,205 they ignore the reality 
that customary international law at one time is different than 
customary international law at a later time.206 Instead of using 
hard-line rules to bar types of claims under the ATS indefinitely, 
courts need to base their language in time-based parameters and 
use narrow holdings. 
 
 200. See supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text. 
 201. Supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text (tracking the development 
of customary international law). 
 202. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 723–24 (2004) (noting that 
the customary international law in 1789 consisted primarily of piracy, violation 
of safe conducts, and treatment of diplomats). 
 203. See Sohn, supra note 106, at 9–12 (discussing the formation of interna-
tional human rights law and international human rights institutions). 
 204. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Forward: The Justices of Rules and Stand-
ards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 66 (1992) (“Standards, by contrast, are flexible and 
permit decisionmakers to adapt them to changing circumstances over time.”). 
 205. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 
(1985) (identifying certainty, uniformity, stability, and security as virtues of 
rules); Sullivan, supra note 204, at 65 (summarizing the advantages of rules as 
consistency, the appearance of consistency, uniformity, and predictability (cit-
ing Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1178–82 (1989))).  
 206. See Schlag, supra note 205, at 400 (identifying that standards have an 
advantage over rules when flexibility, individualization, and dynamism are 
needed).  
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For example, the Supreme Court should revisit their rule in 
Jesner disallowing foreign corporate liability.207 Here is a plau-
sible hypothetical scenario. Let’s assume that customary inter-
national law at the time of the Jesner decision did not recognize 
foreign corporate liability for an international human rights vi-
olation.208 Five years following Jesner, the international commu-
nity and the United States sign a treaty recognizing foreign cor-
porate liability for the violation of human rights.209 Following 
the American recognition and incorporation of foreign corporate 
liability into customary international law, a foreign plaintiff 
then brings an ATS claim against a foreign corporation into fed-
eral court. The district court judge will be faced with a difficult 
legal conundrum: will the court dismiss the suit under Jesner 
and the bar on foreign corporate liability, or will the court recog-
nize foreign corporate liability in accordance with the law of na-
tions? If the Supreme Court in Jesner had ruled that the law of 
nations had not recognized foreign corporate liability at the time 
of decision, the district court would retain the ability to use its 
power of judicial review to inquire as to the state of customary 
international law in the context of this new case.210 Flexibility is 
therefore necessary to avoid this conflict. 
 
 207. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018) (“[T]he Court 
holds that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under 
the ATS.”). 
 208. As noted earlier, debate continues regarding whether customary inter-
national law recognizes foreign corporate liability. See supra note 178. For an-
other discussion of corporate liability, compare Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1400–05 
(finding that the international community does not recognize foreign corporate 
liability), with id. at 1423–27 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ma-
jority conflates the role of international tribunals and argues that our military 
and other nations recognize foreign corporate liability). 
 209. The prospects of the international community recognizing transna-
tional corporate liability in human rights abuses is not too far-fetched. At the 
twenty-sixth Human Rights Council session, the United Nations General As-
sembly established a working group on transnational corporations with respect 
to human rights whose mandate is to “elaborate an international legally binding 
instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of 
transnational corporations . . . .” Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014). 
 210. See Sullivan, supra note 204, at 115 (finding that that standard-like 
approaches engage in context-specific balancing tests). 
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2. Limiting Options Under the ATS Is Not Deferential 
Judicial deference invites political branch input, but hard-
line rules close the deferential discourse.211 Increasingly, as the 
world becomes more globalized and international issues enter 
American courtrooms more frequently, courts will need to grap-
ple with cases with foreign policy implications.212 Foreign policy-
making reflects different administrations’ and legislatures’ ide-
als, goals, and interpretations of the global political environ-
ment.213 It is settled that the Constitution does not grant courts 
the ability to engage in foreign policy-making,214 and the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly affirmed the importance of deferring 
to the political branches in ATS cases.215 Judicial deference to 
the political branches is, in effect, a dialogue. The Judiciary is 
faced with a legal question for which it needs the input of the 
political branches.216 The political branches then submit their 
understanding of the international and policy ramifications of 
the case.217 Based on the legal arguments and merits of the case, 
with the input of the political branches, the Supreme Court 
 
 211. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 661–62 (identifying that courts give sig-
nificant deference to the Executive Branch’s evaluation of facts implicating for-
eign affairs, including international ramifications, determinations of the facts, 
and international recognition of customary international law); Sullivan, supra 
note 204, at 69 (“Rules block the dialogue that standards promote.”). 
 212. See Jack I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in International 
Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 L. & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 461, 462 (1993) (“Notwithstanding the ostensible acceptance and le-
gitimacy of these propositions, the evaluation of foreign policy considerations by 
the courts has dramatically increased in recent times. The phenomenon here 
described is a by-product of . . . ‘globalization.’”). 
 213. See HENKIN, supra note 35, at 31–35 (arguing that the drafters of the 
Constitution allocated foreign policy powers to Congress and the President to 
adapt the young, transforming nation to an ever-changing world). 
 214. See supra Part I.A. But see Garvey, supra note 212, at 462 (arguing that 
in practice, courts, in the consideration of applying judicial doctrine to cases 
that implicate foreign policy, implicate their own foreign policy choices within 
their decisions). 
 215. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018) (emphasiz-
ing that deference to the political branches is vital when foreign policy conse-
quences are at stake (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 
124 (2013))); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (encourag-
ing deference to the Executive Branch’s view of the foreign policy implications). 
 216. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 661–62 (finding that courts invite the 
political branches to submit foreign policy assessments). 
 217. See id.  
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makes a ruling.218 However, when courts curtail the types of 
cases that can be brought with bright-line rules, the dialogue 
about the merits of each case with the political branches can no 
longer take place.219 To be clear, judicial deference should not be 
equated to always following the lead of the political branches or 
mandating that litigation proceed; judicial deference is keeping 
the availability of the deferential dialogue open for future ATS 
cases.220 
 A common response to these inflexible ATS rules by the Su-
preme Court is that Congress should just legislate and amend 
the ATS to overrule the courts.221 While engaging in a traditional 
dialogic exchange would force clearer articulations from Con-
gress,222 it undermines the ATS in two regards. First, Congress 
intended the jurisdictional grant of the ATS to be broad and in-
corporate all law of nations norms.223 As described earlier, the 
law of nations is dynamic and constantly changing.224 Following 
 
 218. See id. 
 219. See Sullivan, supra note 204, at 69 (“Rules block the dialogue that 
standards promote.”). 
 220. Across different administrations and partisan lines, actors within the 
political branches have advocated for keeping decisions tailored to the specific 
facts, and leaving possible remedies open for foreign policy-making purposes. 
See Brief of United States Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Lindsey Graham 
as Amici Curiae, supra note 189, at *2 (arguing on behalf of the Crime and Ter-
rorism Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee that keeping corporate 
liability available under the ATS is essential for Congress’s foreign policy initi-
atives to fight terrorism); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra 
note 189, at *5 (arguing on behalf of the Trump administration that corporate 
liability should be reserved under the ATS and the Court should dismiss on 
other grounds); Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at *22–
23, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), 1980 WL 
340146 (arguing on behalf of the Carter administration that availability of hu-
man rights remedies are important for United States foreign policy in specific 
cases); see also Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Given the 
deference to the political branches that Sosa encourages, I find it puzzling that 
the Court so eagerly departs from the express assessment of the Executive 
Branch and Members of Congress that corporations can be defendants in ATS 
actions.”). 
 221. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1406 (majority opinion) (alluding that Congress 
can simply amend the ATS because “Congress is well aware of the necessity of 
clarifying the proper scope of liability under the ATS . . . .”). 
 222. Id.  
 223. See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text (outlining the history and 
passage of the ATS). 
 224. See supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text. 
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international embarrassment, the purpose of this founding-era 
statute was to recognize all customary international law and in-
corporate it.225 Adding qualifications, exceptions, and clarifica-
tions in response to Supreme Court cases may create inconsist-
encies and complications as the law of nations develops and 
changes. For example, suppose Congress articulates that extra-
territoriality applies to specific customary international law vio-
lations at time t. At time t+1, the law of nations recognizes a new 
customary international law norm that puts an affirmative duty 
for nations to apply extraterritorially. However, the ATS only 
recognizes the extraterritorial claims enumerated at time t, 
which makes the law of nations at t+1 and the extraterritoriality 
amendment incompatible. Second, constant back-and-forth be-
tween Congress and the Supreme Court frustrates the ATS’s 
flexibility by heightening the political costs of repeatedly recog-
nizing and incorporating customary international law stand-
ards.226 In its long history, Congress has amended the ATS three 
times with minor textual changes.227 However, persistent legis-
lative response to hard-line judicial positions would require fre-
quent adjustments, expenditure of political capital, and constant 
monitoring of customary international law to make sure it is 
properly implemented.228  
3. Inflexibility Makes Human Rights Compliance More 
Difficult 
Hard-line rules are against the United States’ foreign policy 
interest because it makes international human rights compli-
ance more difficult for the United States. It is well-settled that 
 
 225. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 92, at 466–67 (describing the purposes 
of the passage of the ATS). 
 226. By political costs, I mean the time and political capital spent every time 
Congress seeks to draft and pass new bills. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Judi-
cial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible, 92 MINN. L. REV. 387, 416–17 
(2007) (explaining that, in the example of the Sherman Antitrust Act, “Con-
gress . . . saved itself time and energy by legislating in this broad and vague 
fashion, and leaving the rest to judicial implementation”).  
 227. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 934 (1948) (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018)); Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1093 (1911); 
Revised Statutes tit. 13, ch. 3, § 563, para. 16 (1873). 
 228. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 226, at 417 (commenting that if courts had 
interpreted the broad Sherman Antitrust Act narrowly “Congress would have 
been forced to expend resources to overturn the decision and to craft a statute 
that the judges could enforce properly”). 
  
1680 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1647 
 
without a remedy, a recognized right is nothing more than polit-
ical lip service.229 Within the context of human rights, the United 
States routinely signs and ratifies conventions that place affirm-
ative duties on states to enforce those rights.230 From an idealist 
perspective, the United States is a traditional leader in the fight 
for human rights and has repeatedly affirmed its commitment 
for upholding them.231 As discussed above, hard-line rules that 
make unilateral statements about the applicability of the statute 
may directly conflict with future human rights obligations.232 
From a more realist perspective, states have incentives to follow 
the rules of the international system to gain and operate under 
international legitimacy.233 The ATS arose following interna-
tional disasters that greatly affected the nascent nation’s credi-
bility on the world stage.234 Inflexible approaches that do not re-
serve the ability for potential redress for alleged human rights 
violations would jeopardize the United States’ position within 
the global order and the international human rights system. 
 
 229. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a set-
tled and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a rem-
edy, and every injury its proper redress.”). 
 230. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide art. V, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 1021 (“The Contracting Parties 
undertake to enact . . . effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide.”).  
 231. See NATALIE KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE 93 
(1990) (discussing the leadership and influence of the United States over the 
drafting of international human rights conventions). 
 232. See supra notes 207–10 and accompanying text (explaining the hypo-
thetical passing of an internationally recognized corporate liability treaty). 
 233. See FRANCK, supra note 58, at 155 (“[The United States] is concerned 
to see minimum standards [of human rights] observed in other countries in or-
der to safeguard [its] own standards, to promote conditions that [are] conducive 
to American prosperity and to American interests in international peace and 
security.”); see also David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Com-
pliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 879 (2003) (offering the signaling theory of human 
rights compliance to fill gaps in understanding from traditional scholarship). 
 234. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1435 (2018) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (explaining the ATS was the source of international law enforce-
ment following international embarrassment). 
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III.  USING THE EXISTING TOOLS IN THE TOOLBOX: 
SOLUTIONS TO THE JUDICIAL OVER-RESTRICTION OF 
THE ATS   
This Part proposes a new, flexible three-step framework ap-
plying existing judicial doctrine to ATS actions in order to com-
bat fears of judicial intervention in foreign policy. Section III.A 
introduces each step and addresses how applying these judicial 
doctrines balances competing foreign policy considerations. Sec-
tion III.B then applies the new flexible framework to the most 
recent ATS Supreme Court case, Doe v. Nestle.235 
A. NO NEED TO REINVENT THE WHEEL: A JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE ATS AND FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This Section proposes an alternative, step-by-step frame-
work for federal judges to apply in an ATS case. The framework 
uses preexisting judicial doctrines in foreign relations law that 
limit judicial interference in foreign affairs, and each judicial 
doctrine corresponds to foreign policy concerns raised by the Su-
preme Court during the litigation of the ATS. The three-step in-
quiry is as follows: (1) apply an ATS-specific, two-step Political 
Question doctrine inquiry to continue to encourage judicial cau-
tion in the recognition of actions; (2) apply the Exhaustion prin-
ciple to prevent foreign criticism while staying compliant with 
international law; and (3) apply the Act of State doctrine to re-
spect foreign sovereignty while recognizing human rights 
abuses. The goal of the framework is not to mandate litigation 
or make litigation necessarily easier for plaintiffs. The goal is 
rather to provide flexibility for the political branches to pursue 
foreign policy objectives, keep the possibility of human rights re-
dress open, and limit judicial concerns of foreign affairs inter-
vention. 
1. The Political Question Doctrine and Recognition of Claims 
Under the ATS  
First, a court must ask itself two questions: (1) is the cus-
tomary international law claimed by the plaintiff universal, spe-
cific, and obligatory as understood in the historical paradigms 
 
 235. 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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when the ATS was enacted?;236 and (2) what are the political 
branches’ understandings of the international ramifications if 
this customary international law claim is recognized?237 This 
two-part inquiry will fulfill the “Political Question step.” Taking 
the more accessible and modern approach to the Political Ques-
tion doctrine,238 the two-pronged inquiry seeks to satisfy the “ju-
dicially manageable” prong239 and the “international reputation” 
prong240 within the context of the ATS. The Political Question 
step addresses the Judiciary’s fear of creating causes of action 
without express authorization from Congress.241  
The first question incorporates the “judicially manageable” 
prong and the language from the one flexible standard an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.242 
 
 236. As discussed below, this question incorporates the standards articu-
lated in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). See supra Part II.A.1 
(discussing the standard from Sosa).  
 237. This question incorporates judicial deference to the political branches 
in foreign affairs. See supra Part I.A (discussing judicial deference to the politi-
cal branches in foreign affairs). 
 238. As previously noted, the Political Question doctrine faces frequent crit-
icism for its confusing and complex application. See Pollock, supra note 62, at 
242 (“At present, however, courts have unnecessarily complicated and confused 
the analysis of ATS claims by squarely addressing the political question doc-
trine.”). 
 239. See supra Part I.B.1; see also Korman, supra note 49, at 109 (“[T]he first 
three Baker factors . . . are reduced to the question of whether the matter before 
the court is a violation of international law . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Nzelibe, 
supra note 36, at 963 (“The most widely cited prudential or institutional compe-
tence factor involves the claim that the disputed issue ‘lack[s] . . . judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards.’”(alterations in original)); Pollock, supra 
note 62, at 242 (“The first three parts of the Baker test concern the separation 
of powers . . . .”). 
 240. See supra Part I.B.1; see also Korman, supra note 49, at 109 (“[T]he last 
three Baker factors . . . are really three separate ways of asking the question of 
whether adjudication infringes on the executive’s ability to conduct the na-
tion’s foreign affairs.”); Pollock, supra note 62, at 242 (“[T]he last three [parts of 
the Baker test] concern issues of respect . . . .”); Price, supra note 60, at 336 
(“[T]he risk of harm to the international reputation of the United States is 
thought to come into play in foreign relations cases, implicating the final three 
Baker factors.”); The Political Question Doctrine, supra note 55, at 1196 (noting 
that courts are particularly interested in the three respect factors). 
 241. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (“Since many attempts by federal courts to 
craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would raise 
risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at 
all, with great caution.”). 
 242. Id. at 724, 732 (ruling that ATS claims brought under the law of nations 
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Courts and scholars alike have recognized the importance of ar-
ticulated standards to ground the Judiciary’s exercise of claim 
identification under the law of nations.243 Additionally, manage-
able standards give courts the ability to recognize the rise of new 
customary international law norms as they develop over time.244 
The second question incorporates the international reputation 
prong, which explicitly gives opportunity for courts to defer to 
the political branches. The international reputation prong at-
tempts to avoid embarrassment, either in respect to the political 
branches or the international community.245 Throughout its ATS 
decisions, the Supreme Court has articulated a desire for politi-
cal branch deference but has never explained how deference 
would be incorporated into the ATS claim evaluation.246 By man-
dating the second question, courts will have clear instruction for 
when to defer to the other branches and how to incorporate state-
ments of interests.247 The Political Question step adequately pre-
vents the Judiciary from making internationally-unrecognized 
causes of action while creating a specific step for political branch 
deference.  
 
needs to be specific, obligatory, and universal, as well as defined and recognized 
in the paradigms as eighteenth century customary international law).  
 243. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d. 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[U]niver-
sally recognized norms of international law provide judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for adjudicating suits brought under the [ATS], which 
obviates any need to make initial policy decisions of the kind normally reserved 
for nonjudicial discretion.”); Korman, supra note 49, at 109–10. 
 244. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the importance of maintaining flexible 
standards to account for the dynamic nature of the law of nations). 
 245. See Price, supra note 60, at 336 (“[T]he risk of harm to the international 
reputation of the United States is thought to come into play in foreign relations 
cases . . . .”). 
 246. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018) (emphasiz-
ing that deference to the political branches is vital when foreign policy conse-
quences are at stake (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 
124 (2013))); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21 (encouraging deference to the Executive 
Branch’s view of foreign policy implications). 
 247. ATS scholarship often grapples with how to incorporate deference and 
executive statements into judicial review of ATS cases. See, e.g., Korman, supra 
note 49 (advocating for deference-based approaches to ATS claims); Margarita 
S. Clarens, Note, Deference, Human Rights and the Federal Courts: The Role of 
the Executive in Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 415, 
424–28 (2007) (analyzing how the Executive Branch can be involved with the 
litigation of ATS cases); Sutcliffe, supra note 66 (offering a comprehensive 
framework to incorporate executive statements). 
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2. The Exhaustion Principle and Balancing Foreign Criticism 
with Human Rights Compliance 
The second question a court should ask is: has the plaintiff 
exhausted available local and domestic remedies in more appro-
priate jurisdictions?248 In order to prove that the plaintiff satis-
fied the Exhaustion principle, they must prove that they: (1) ex-
hausted all internal legal remedies in that host country; (2) 
exhausted all legal remedies that are available or accessible to 
them; and (3) the remedies offered by the host state are inade-
quate and ineffective.249 The purpose of the Exhaustion principle 
is respecting foreign sovereignty while making certain that the 
aggrieved party will have a forum to remedy their injury.250 Ex-
haustion allows a host state to have an opportunity to remedy a 
human rights violation.251 The Supreme Court, throughout its 
ATS jurisprudence, has addressed the Exhaustion principle but 
has never required its application.252 An Exhaustion principle 
requirement would discourage district courts from involving 
themselves in foreign affairs,253 respect the sovereignty of ade-
quate and effective host jurisdictions, and disincentivize plain-
tiffs from “forum-shopping.”254 The Exhaustion principle would 
also significantly quell foreign policy intervention concerns while 
still reserving the ability of the plaintiff to bring an ATS claim 
in American courts and requiring courts to make sure that in-
jured parties can receive redress in at least some forum. 
 
 248. The second question incorporates the Exhaustion principle. See supra 
Part I.B.2 (discussing the Exhaustion principle). 
 249. See Duruigbo, supra note 70, at 1259–61 (providing a summary of the 
elements that need to be proved in order to satisfy the Exhaustion principle).  
 250. Id. at 1255–56.  
 251. See Waugh, supra note 68, at 556 (explaining the rationale for the Ex-
haustion principle). 
 252. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1430–31 (2018) (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that courts have the option to dismiss ATS suits 
under the Exhaustion principle); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 
108, 139 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that exhaustion would mini-
mize international friction); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 
(2004) (suggesting that a requirement of exhaustion may apply). 
 253. See Ron A. Ghatan, Note, The Alien Tort Statute and Prudential Ex-
haustion, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1273, 1299 (2011) (noting the advantages of man-
datory exhaustion over prudential exhaustion). 
 254. See generally Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping 
System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011) (arguing for anti-forum shopping 
measures in the face of increasing transnational litigation in United States 
courts).  
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 The Exhaustion principle, rather than the elimination of 
extraterritorial application, would allow the political branches to 
have more flexibility in enforcing foreign policy and keep the 
United States in better compliance with international human 
rights law. The political branches may want to reserve the right 
to apply the ATS extraterritorially.255 Notably, there have been 
multiple extraterritorial ATS cases in which plaintiffs were 
awarded damages.256 Past conduct by the political branches in-
dicate that extraterritorial application of the ATS may serve 
their policy interests.257 Additionally, the Exhaustion principle 
allows for the United States to remain compliant with interna-
tional law.258 Some customary international law norms are 
deemed non-derogable and apply universally.259 Forbidding en-
forcement of these vital international norms could severely dam-
age the legitimacy of the United States within the international 
system.260 The Exhaustion principle provides a flexible frame-
work to both satisfy American foreign policy decisions and inter-
national law expectations.  
3. The Act of State Doctrine and Balancing Foreign 
Sovereignty Infringement with Recognizing Human Rights 
Abuses  
Third, a court should ask: is the court inquiring into the va-
lidity of the acts of foreign governments taken within their own 
 
 255. See Sloss, supra note 171, at 247 (explaining that Congress and the Ex-
ecutive Branch favored a case-by-case approach rather than a bright-line rule). 
 256. Id. at 248 (noting that Filartiga and Tel-Oren were applied extraterri-
torially). 
 257. Id. at 247–48. 
 258. See Doyle, supra note 188, at 231–32 (explaining that the territoriality 
requirement under the ATS is inherently incompatible with jus cogens norms of 
international law). 
 259. See Sloss, supra note 171, at 243–44 (“[T]he universality principle is a 
widely accepted principle of international law that authorizes States to apply 
their laws extraterritorially . . . .”). 
 260. Cf. Ghatan, supra note 253, at 1291–92 (arguing that there should be 
an exception to the exhaustion requirement under the ATS for human rights 
violations with universal jurisdiction). I would argue that the Exhaustion prin-
ciple should still be applied. Perhaps international tribunals and specialty 
courts are made specifically to address these violations. The United States may 
usurp the authority and legitimacy of the international courts and specialty 
courts. 
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territory?261 This inquiry addresses a situation laden with for-
eign policy consequences; will an American court judge the ac-
tions of a foreign government conducted on its own soil? Courts 
traditionally reserve the right to dismiss a case if it realizes it is 
reviewing the actions of a foreign government.262 Unlike the Ex-
haustion principle, which is an internationally recognized prin-
ciple and avoids judicial intervention in foreign affairs,263 the Act 
of State doctrine primarily operates to promote harmony in in-
ternational relations, not in international law.264 The Act of 
State doctrine guards against the most direct infringement of 
foreign sovereignty: putting a government on trial in a foreign 
court.265 Although it has grown to recognize individual rights, 
the international system is, first and foremost, a state-first sys-
tem, which aims to keep the integrity of the state intact.266 Ab-
stention from judicial review of ATS claims under the Act of 
State doctrine would directly address the consistent fear of 
courts to put a foreign government on trial.  
The Act of State doctrine is an appropriate alternative to the 
creation of broad, hard-line rules, such as categorical elimination 
of foreign corporate liability. In Jesner, both the majority and the 
dissent raise the fear of infringing on the sovereignty of other 
 
 261. This question incorporates the Act of State doctrine. See supra Part 
I.B.3 (discussing the Act of State doctrine). 
 262. See FRANCK, supra note 58, at 98 (“The essence of the [A]ct of [S]tate 
doctrine is a refusal to rule on legitimacy of a foreign government’s actions or 
laws insofar as these have taken effect entirely within the foreign jurisdiction.”). 
 263. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Exhaustion principle’s roots in in-
ternational and American law). 
 264. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 100, at 839 (“[I]nternational law[,] 
generally, primarily governed relations among nations, not the relations be-
tween a nation and its citizens.”). 
 265. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations 
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1184 (2007) (“The [A]ct of [S]tate doctrine prevents 
courts from angering foreign sovereigns by expressing disapproval of their sov-
ereign acts.”). 
 266. See Burley, supra note 88, at 1940 (arguing that the Act of State doc-
trine promotes harmony of international relations rather than harmony of in-
ternational law). 
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nations.267 Citing this fear, however, the majority rules to cate-
gorically eliminate foreign corporate liability under the ATS.268 
However, this ruling is not sufficiently tailored to the interest 
that the Supreme Court aims to protect.269 Nothing about a cor-
poration being foreign in and of itself implicates sovereignty in-
fringements;270 corporations that are state-owned or state-con-
trolled do offer questions of sovereignty infringement.271 
Applying the Act of State doctrine will cut straight to the heart 
of the issue by asking: are the courts reviewing the actions of a 
foreign government? This narrow tailoring, again, reserves flex-
ibility for the political branches to use the ATS to continue to 
identify international law claims without the fear of putting a 
state on trial.272  
B. APPLYING THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO DOE V. NESTLE  
This Section will apply the proposed three-step framework 
to the ongoing Doe v. Nestle273 case to give an example of the 
proposed framework in action. In Nestle, plaintiffs were former 
child slaves who were trafficked from Mali to Cote d’Ivoire to 
cultivate cocoa beans on behalf of Nestle and Nestle Ivory 
 
 267. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018) (“Jordan con-
siders the instant litigation to be a ‘grave affront’ to its sovereignty.”); id. at 
1429–30 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that Jordan considers ATS action 
in this case to infringe its sovereignty). 
 268. Id. at 1412 (majority opinion) (“Foreign corporate liability would not 
only fail to meaningfully advance the objectives of the ATS, but it would also 
lead to precisely those ‘serious consequences in international affairs’ that the 
ATS was enacted to avoid.”).  
 269. Id. at 1429 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Each source of diplomatic fric-
tion that respondent Arab Bank and the plurality identify can be addressed with 
a tool more tailored to the source of the problem than a blanket ban on corporate 
liability.”).  
 270. Id. (“Nothing about the corporate form in itself justifies categorically 
foreclosing corporate liability in all ATS actions.”).  
 271. See Larry Catá Backer, The Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned 
Enterprises: Emerging Conceptual Structures and Principles in National and 
International Law and Policy, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 827, 870 (2017) (“A 
state owner whose control is extensive enough may be deemed to have assumed 
both the authority for and the obligations of the enterprise.”). 
 272. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1430 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
United States prefers the Court to address the root of the foreign policy impli-
cations with the corresponding judicial doctrine). 
 273. 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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Coast.274 Plaintiffs assert that both corporations are liable for 
aiding and abetting in child slavery under the ATS.275 After ap-
plying the ATS framework, the Court would most likely find 
that: (1) the claim brought satisfies the Political Question step; 
(2) the plaintiffs have exhausted available domestic remedies; 
and (3) the actions of the defendant are not acts of state. Conse-
quently, the case should proceed.  
First, are the crimes of aiding and abetting child slavery by 
a foreign corporation universal, specific, and obligatory as un-
derstood in the historical paradigms when the ATS was en-
acted?276 The ATS claim in Nestle has three components: (1) child 
slavery; (2) aiding and abetting; and (3) foreign corporate liabil-
ity. Slavery is a customary international law violation, fitting 
within the parameters of being “universal, specific, and obliga-
tory,” and being repeatedly affirmed by American courts as a jus 
cogens, or non-derogable norm.277 Aiding and abetting in the vi-
olation of customary international law, also, has been repeatedly 
upheld as a violation by American courts.278 The question then 
turns on whether customary international law recognizes for-
eign corporate liability. As mentioned earlier, there is a split 
amongst judges and academics alike if customary international 
law recognizes foreign corporate liability.279 However, the second 
prong of the Political Question step will tip the scale in favor of 
corporate liability recognition. What are the political branches’ 
 
 274. Id. at 1122–23.  
 275. Id. at 1122.  
 276. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 277. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“[S]lavery [is a] jus cogens violation[ ]  and, thus, [a] violation[ ]  of the law of 
nations . . . .”); Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1154 
n.5 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The fact [is] that some jus cogens norms are beyond ques-
tion, such as the norm against slavery . . . .”). See generally Thomas Weatherall, 
Note, Lessons from the Alien Tort Statute: Jus Cogens as the Law of Nations, 
103 GEO. L.J. 1359 (2005) (using ATS jurisprudence to identify jus cogens norms 
understood by United States courts). 
 278. See Nestle, 906 F.3d at 1124 (“[W]e held that corporations are liable for 
aiding and abetting slavery . . . .”).  
 279. See generally Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (dis-
cussing, between the majority and dissent, if customary international law rec-
ognizes foreign corporate liability). For a discussion of whether international 
law recognizes corporate liability, see supra note 178. 
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understanding of the international ramifications if this custom-
ary international law claim is recognized?280 Although the 
United States has not filed an amicus brief in this case, its brief 
in Jesner v. Arab Bank is instructive.281 The United States ar-
gued extensively in Jesner that corporations can be a defendant 
under the ATS,282 and customary international law recognizes 
corporate liability regarding human rights abuses.283 In the face 
of judicial deadlock, executive deference dictates that the view 
and expertise of the United States to recognize corporate liability 
should sway the Court to recognize the claims brought by the 
plaintiffs in Nestle.284 Consequently, the Political Question step 
is satisfied. 
Second, has the plaintiff exhausted available local and do-
mestic remedies in more appropriate jurisdictions?285 Plaintiffs 
in this case adequately pled that they have exhausted all avail-
able local remedies.286 In Mali, there is no law under which 
plaintiffs could recover damages for the injuries they incurred as 
a result of human rights violations.287 In Cote d’Ivoire, judicial 
corruption is well-documented, and the lack of due process, judi-
cial enforcement, and fair outcomes continues to be a problem.288 
 
 280. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 281. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 189. 
 282. Id. at *8–25. 
 283. Id. at *24 (“Furthermore, a number of current international agree-
ments . . . affirmatively require signatory nations to impose liability on corpo-
rations for certain actions.”). 
 284. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 661–62 (identifying that deference to the 
political branches includes evaluating their views and expertise of what custom-
ary international law is). 
 285. See supra Part III.A.2.  
 286. First Amended Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Dam-
ages, Doe v. Nestle, No. 205CV05133, 2009 WL 292108, ¶ 2 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 
2009). 
 287. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MALI 2018 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 9 
(2018), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Mali-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M5TD-W57W] (noting that corruption, bribery, and executive 
influence seriously damage judicial credibility, and Mali’s judicial system does 
not provide the same rights as civil courts). 
 288. First Amended Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Dam-
ages, supra note 286, ¶ 2; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COTE D’IVOIRE 2018 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 7–8 (2018), https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country 
-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cote-divoire/ [https://perma.cc/WZ5H 
-UBTL] (noting that injured parties are consistently denied due process due to 
corruption, lack of judicial independence, and harassment of judicial actors). 
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Simply put, the opportunity for both Mali and Cote d’Ivoire to 
legitimately provide remedies does not exist. The plaintiffs have 
satisfied the Exhaustion principle.  
Third, is the Court inquiring into the validity of the acts of 
foreign governments taken within their own territory?289 In this 
case, the answer is no. Nestle is neither a foreign government 
nor even a state-owned enterprise.290 Although Nestle argues 
that litigation would infringe on the sovereignty of Mali and Cote 
d’Ivoire, that argument is in regard to the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the ATS.291 Instead of creating a broad, restrictive rule 
to address this concern,292 the Exhaustion principle analysis is 
more sufficiently tailored to this concern than the Act of State 
doctrine.293 With all steps of the proposed three-step framework 
satisfied, the plaintiffs in Nestle should be able to bring a claim 
forward under the ATS.  
  CONCLUSION   
The Supreme Court has whittled away at the flexibility of 
the ATS through the use of bright-line rules, such as the elimi-
nation of extraterritorial application and foreign corporate lia-
bility. These categorical restrictions on the types of ATS cases 
that can be brought creates an inflexible framework through 
which the foreign policy objectives of the political branches can-
not be advanced. A case-by-case approach to the ATS is neces-
sary; the Supreme Court should use existing judicial doctrines 
 
 289. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 290. See NESTLÉ, NESTLÉ ANNUAL REVIEW 2018, at 59 (2018), https://www 
.nestle.com/asset-library/documents/library/documents/annual_reports/2018 
-annual-review-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T8U-EH68] (noting that Nestlé is 
owned by private institutions and individual shareholders); see also Backer, su-
pra note 271, at 858 (“SOEs [state-owned enterprises] must be recognized by 
some national law as (1) an enterprise (2) in which the state (3) exercises own-
ership.”). 
 291. See Supplemental Brief of Nestle USA, Inc. at *7–14, Doe v. Nestle, 906 
F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 2:05-cv-05133-SVW-MRW), 2018 WL 2299136 
(arguing that extraterritorial application of the ATS raises foreign policy con-
cerns and the case should consequently be dismissed). 
 292. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1429 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (“Each source of diplomatic friction that respondent . . . identif[ies] 
can be addressed with a tool more tailored to the source of the problem than a 
blanket ban . . . .”). 
 293. Id. at 1430 (emphasizing that the United States wants courts to address 
specific foreign policy implications with the corresponding judicial doctrine). 
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to restrict its own interference in foreign policy while still ad-
vancing the purpose of the ATS to allow redress for human rights 
violations in the interest of American foreign policy. The Su-
preme Court should institute a three-step judicial framework to 
the ATS. First, the Court should apply a two-part Political Ques-
tion inquiry that satisfies both the judicially manageable stand-
ard and international reputation prongs. Second, the Court 
should employ the Exhaustion principle to better comply with 
international law while avoiding foreign criticism. Third, the 
Court should focus on the conduct of defendants and use Act of 
State inquiries to avoid infringing on the sovereignty of foreign 
nations. Employing this three-step framework will effectively 
balance the United States’ flexible foreign policy interests 
against fears of judicial interventionism. 
 
